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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A Boise City police officer seized Virgil Lynn Nott after the officer saw him enter a
single-stall bathroom with another male and grocery bag of beer at Rhodes Skate Park. The
officer uncovered controlled substances and paraphernalia in Mr. Nott’s possession. The State
charged him with three drug offenses. Mr. Nott moved to suppress the evidence from the
warrantless seizure and subsequent search, arguing the officer did not have reasonable suspicion
for the investigatory detention. The district court denied his motion. Mr. Nott entered a
conditional guilty plea. He now appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction and
contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 2, 2016, in the early afternoon, Boise City Police Officer Tom Shuler
approached Mr. Nott and girlfriend, Ms. Torres, on 15th Street and Washington Street, near the
Albertson’s grocery store. (R., p.64; Tr. Vol. I,1 p.15, L.6–p.16, L.11.) Mr. Nott and Ms. Torres
were wearing backpacks and carrying a duffel bag. (R., p.64.) They also had a grocery bag with a
six-pack of beer inside.2 (R., p.64; Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.6–17.) Officer Shuler, who frequently
interacted with the homeless community due to his patrol area, 3 decided to introduce himself to

1

There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the motion to
suppress hearing, held on September 21, 2016, and the sentencing hearing, held on
November 14, 2016. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the entry of plea hearing, held on
September 28, 2016.
2
Officer Shuler noticed that one of the beers was missing. (Tr., p.17, L.15.) He could not recall
who was holding the bag. (Tr., p.17, Ls.18–22.)
3
Officer Shuler is a “bicycle patrol officer whose area of responsibility includes downtown
Boise, the greenbelt along the Boise River and the Boise parks. His area also includes Cooper
Court, a former homeless encampment, the homeless shelters and non-profits which serve the
1

Mr. Nott and Ms. Torres because they looked new to town. (R., p.64.) Mr. Nott told Officer
Shuler that they had just arrived on a Greyhound bus from Washington, had Section 8 vouchers,
and hoped to find housing in Boise. (R., p.64; Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.6–7.) Officer Shuler gave them
information on housing shelters and food. (R., p.64.) He also told them that it was illegal to drink
in any park except Ann Morrison Park and gave them directions to the park. (R., p.64.) Mr. Nott
told Officer Shuler that he had a medical marijuana card. (R., pp.64-65.) Officer Shuler advised
Mr. Nott that marijuana use was illegal in Idaho. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler then left. (R., p.65.)
Later that day, Officer Shuler saw Mr. Nott and Ms. Torres at Rhodes Skate Park, which
was a few blocks from their first encounter. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler frequently patrols this area
because the police have had a lot of trouble with alcohol, drugs, and other illegal activity in the
park’s bathrooms. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler explained that Rhodes Skate Park is near all the
homeless shelters, so “you will have from five to twenty individuals just kind of sitting next to
the sidewalk on the west end of the park.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.17–21.) Officer Shuler saw
Ms. Torres coming out of the bathroom area and drinking out of a beer can. 4 (R., p.65) It is
illegal to drink alcohol at Rhodes Skate Park. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler talked to Ms. Torres, and
she told him that she was not drinking beer but had put water in the can. (R., p.65.) She poured
some clear liquid out of the can for him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.22, L.24–p.23, L.2.) He suggested a
different container for water and reminded her about drinking alcohol in only Ann Morrison
Park. (R., p.65; Tr. Vol. I, p.23, Ls.2–9, Ls.17–24.)

homeless community. His work involves frequent contact with the homeless community.”
(R., p.64.)
4
Officer Shuler could not say for sure if Ms. Torres’s beer can was the same as the beer cans he
saw earlier in their grocery bag. (Tr. Vol. I, p.23, Ls.10–14.)
2

Officer Shuler then saw Mr. Nott and another man walk towards the park bathrooms.
(R., p.65.) Mr. Nott had the grocery bag with beer. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler saw the men look
around and go into one of the bathrooms. (R., p.65.) The bathrooms are single stall, single
occupant. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler went to the bathrooms, and Ms. Torres followed. (R., p.65.)
Officer Shuler reminded her again of their conversation about drinking alcohol in Ann Morrison
Park only. (R., p.65.) He asked her why Mr. Nott was going into the bathroom. (R., p.65.) She
remarked that it was “weird” and “something might be up,” but also said, “I think he did go to
the bathroom.” (R., p.65; State’s Ex. 1, 00:03–00:13.) Officer Shuler waited outside. (R., p.65.)
He testified that he thought “they were going in there to share a beer or each have a beer.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.27, Ls.18–24.) He also testified that he thought “something is going to happen in
that bathroom that’s not legal” and “when I see an individual go look around then that’s raising
my awareness that something probably is not right.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.27, Ls.12–13, p.42, Ls.20–23.)
About three to five minutes later, Officer Shuler saw Mr. Nott look out of the bathroom,
see him, and try to shut the door. (R., p.65; Tr. Vol. I, p.28, Ls.1–4.) Officer Shuler opened the
door and told both men to come out and sit down. (R., p.65.) He said that he told them to sit
because:
As a police officer, I need to control the situation. So I’m obviously – it appears a
crime potentially could have occurred. So I can’t just have, you know, I need
everyone outside. So I can find out what’s going on and have them sit down, so
just to do a quick check.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.29, Ls.2–7.) Officer Shuler also did a quick look in the bathroom. (Tr. Vol. I, p.28,
Ls.21–23.) He saw the bag, but it “didn’t appear that beer had been consumed.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.45,
L.25–p.46, L.1.) He also did not see any cans lying around or the men holding any cans.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.1–3.) After some “hem hawing around” for a moment, the men sat down.
(R., p.65; Tr. Vol. I, p.29, L.25–p.30, L.9; State’s Ex. 1, 3:27–3:49.)
3

Officer Shuler reminded Mr. Nott of their conversation earlier and how Mr. Nott was new
to town. (R., p.65; State’s Ex. 1, 3:49–3:55.) Mr. Nott immediately responded that he had
medical marijuana. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler asked for the marijuana and intended to issue a
citation for marijuana possession. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler observed Mr. Nott fumbling for a
while and trying to hide a baggie behind his legs. (R., p.65.) Officer Shuler asked for the baggie.
(R., p.65.) It was a clear plastic baggie with suspected methamphetamine. (R., p.65–66.) Officer
Shuler arrested Mr. Nott. (R., p.66.) Officer Shuler also found marijuana and two pipes in
Mr. Nott’s bag. (See State’s Obj. & Mem. in Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, p.57.) “Once it
was all said and done,” Officer Shuler testified, “it was determined that they had not consumed
alcohol” in the bathroom. (Tr. Vol. I, p.34, Ls.21–25.)
The next day, June 3, 2016, the State filed a Complaint alleging Mr. Nott committed the
crimes of felony possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(c), misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(c), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of
I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.8–9.) Mr. Nott waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound
him over to district court. (R., pp.23–25.) The State filed an Information charging him with the
three drug offenses. (R., pp.33–34.)
Mr. Nott moved to suppress the evidence from the search.5 (R., p.47.) He argued Officer
Shuler did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. (R., pp.49–51.) The State objected.
(R., pp.55–61.) The district court held a hearing on the motion. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.1–p.64,
L.23.) The district court admitted Officer Shuler’s audio recording of the incident, and Officer

5

The State argued the motion was untimely, but the district court found good cause to enlarge
the time. (R., p.58; Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.13–p.11, L.4.) See also Idaho Criminal Rule 12(e).
4

Shuler testified. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.36, L.9 (State’s Ex. 1).) The district court also admitted a
photograph of Mr. Nott at the time of the arrest, which shows dark tattoos covering his face and
neck. (Tr. Vol. I, p.37, L.17 (Def.’s Ex. A).) At the end of the hearing, the district court informed
the parties that it would most likely deny the motion, but would issue a written decision.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.59, L.4–p.63, L.6.) The district court issued a written decision two days later.
(R., pp.64–68.) After providing factual findings, the district court reasoned:
When Officer Shuler saw the defendant and another man enter into a onestall restroom with the grocery sack of beer at a park where consumption of
alcohol was not permitted, and then saw the defendant peek out and start to shut
the restroom door when he saw the police officer, it was permissible for Officer
Shuler to investigate further and to briefly detain the defendant and the other man
as he investigated the situation more fully. . . . Knowing all that he did from the
entire day, there was reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant and investigate
more fully. The defendant was observed going into a single occupant restroom
with another person and the grocery bag which the officer knew had beer in it.
When the defendant peeked out of the restroom and then tried to close the door
when he saw the officer, the officer’s reasonable suspicion that a crime had been
committed or was about to be committed increased. It only increased more
justifiably after that point. The first thing the defendant said after he sat down at
the officer’s instruction was that he had medical marijuana and then he engaged in
a very obvious effort to hide a baggie from the officer.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, Officer Shuler’s actions were
reasonable. There is no basis to suppress the evidence in this case.
(R., pp.66–67.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p.67.)
After the district court denied the motion, Mr. Nott entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.77–78; Tr. Vol. II, p.18, L.2–p.19, L.6.) The State
agreed to dismiss the two misdemeanor charges. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.14–15.) Mr. Nott reserved
the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.77–78; Tr. Vol. II,
p.5, Ls.8–10, p.10, Ls.12–14, p.19, Ls.6–7.) The district court sentenced Mr. Nott to three years,
with one year fixed, and commuted his sentence to 170 days in Ada County Jail, with 166 days

5

of credit for time served. (R., pp.81–82; Tr. Vol. I, p.70, Ls.19–22) Mr. Nott timely appealed
from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.84–85.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nott’s motion to suppress?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nott’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Nott asserts the district erred by denying his motion to suppress because the district

court incorrectly determined Officer Shuler had a lawful justification to detain Mr. Nott. Based
on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Shuler did not have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that Mr. Nott had committed, or was about to commit, a crime. Rather, Officer Shuler
had nothing more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, which was
insufficient to justify his warrantless seizure of Mr. Nott.

B.

Standard of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). “The Court accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005).
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v.
Hunter, 156 Idaho 568, 570 (Ct. App. 2014). The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo. State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109,
111 (2013).

8

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nott’s Motion To Suppress Because
Officer Shuler Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Mr. Nott
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in
original). “A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause, is
presumptively unreasonable.” Hansen, 138 Idaho at 796.
“[T]ypically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable. However,
limited investigatory detentions,6 based on less than probable cause, are permissible when
justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about
to commit, a crime.” State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted)
(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 499–500 (1983) (plurality opinion)). “An
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop.” State v. Smith, 159 Idaho 15, 21 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing Danney, 153 Idaho
at 409). “The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion). The burden is on the State “to establish that the
seizure was based on reasonable suspicion and sufficiently limited in scope and duration to
satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.” State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8, 217 P.3d 1,
8 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion)).

6

These limited investigatory detentions are often called Terry stops. See, e.g., State v. Henage,
143 Idaho 655, 663 (2007); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). “[A]n officer may take into account his experience and law
enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered,” Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, but
“[t]he officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (same). “The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at
112.
Here, there is no dispute Mr. Nott was seized when Officer Shuler ordered him to sit
down after exiting the bathroom. The State recognized an investigatory detention (or Terry stop)
took place. (R., pp.58–61.) The district court also determined Officer Shuler detained Mr. Nott:
“it was permissible for Officer Shuler to investigate further and to briefly detain the defendant
and the other man as he investigated the situation more fully.” (See R., p.67.) As such, the only
issue on appeal is whether the limited investigatory detention was lawful under the Fourth
Amendment.
Mr. Nott contends the investigatory detention was unlawful because Officer Shuler did
not have reasonable suspicion. At the time of the Terry stop, the circumstances known to Officer
Shuler did not justify Mr. Nott’s warrantless seizure. Officer Shuler knew that Mr. Nott had just
arrived from Washington on a Greyhound bus. Mr. Nott carried all of his belongings with him,
and he did not have any prearranged housing. In short, Mr. Nott was homeless. Like many
homeless individuals in the area, Mr. Nott went to Rhodes Skate Park. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.17–
21.) Rhodes Skate Park is “a popular spot,” but also attracts criminal activity and other unseemly

10

behavior for a city park. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, L.13–p.22, L.9.) Regardless, Mr. Nott’s presence in a
high-crime area, without more, is insufficient to support a particularized suspicion that Mr. Nott
was committing a crime. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“An individual’s
presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a
reasonable particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”); see also State v. Bly,
159 Idaho 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2016) (same). Once at the park, Mr. Nott went into the bathroom
with another man. He also had a six-pack, or less, of beer. Possession of beer, however, is not a
crime. It is also not a crime to go into the bathroom with another person. Thus, there was nothing
unlawful about Mr. Nott’s conduct. His conduct may have been unusual, but it was not enough to
establish he committed or was about to commit a crime. See Bly, 159 Idaho at 710 (“And, [the
defendant’s] lawful, albeit unusual, conduct of entering the car numerous times and then
relocating it within the same parking lot is not enough.”).
Although innocent acts can give rise to reasonable suspicion, they do not rise to that level
in this case. “The Supreme Court has previously held that otherwise innocent acts, when
considered together, can be sufficiently suspicious so as to justify an investigative detention.”
State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 764 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9–10). Here, the
totality of the circumstances are not “sufficiently suspicious” to create a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity specific to Mr. Nott. Officer Shuler was unable to articulate
anything more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch. He initially thought that Mr. Nott
and the other man “were going in there to share a beer or each have a beer.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.27,
Ls.18–24.) But that hunch was quickly dispelled. Officer Shuler saw no opened beer cans in the
bathroom or in the men’s hands when he opened the bathroom door and took a quick look.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.28, Ls.21–23, p.45, L.25–p.46, L.1, p.46, Ls.1–3.) At this point, Officer Shuler had

11

no reason to detain Mr. Nott and order him to sit down. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (plurality
opinion) (detention must last “no longer than is necessary” to effectuate its purpose and its scope
must be “carefully tailored” to its justification). Officer Shuler’s only other suspicions were that
“something” illegal was going to happen in the bathroom, “something probably is not right,” and
it appeared “a crime potentially could have occurred.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.27, Ls.12–13, p.29, Ls.2–7,
p.42, Ls.20–23.) This is pure speculation of vague, generalized criminal activity. Ultimately,
Mr. Nott’s conduct was not illegal. Officer Shuler was acting upon hunch because two men—one
of them homeless with extensive face tattoos—went into a bathroom together. Therefore, the
district court erred by determining Officer Shuler had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Nott.
The evidence obtained from Officer Shuler’s search of Mr. Nott and his possessions
“would not have come to light but for the government’s unconstitutional conduct” in detaining
Mr. Nott without reasonable suspicion. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2005).
Mr. Nott made the comment about his marijuana possession during the unlawful detention.
(R., p.65; State’s Ex. 1, 3:49–3:55.) Due to the unlawful seizure, the district court should have
suppressed all evidence obtained from the police’s warrantless search. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional police conduct
subject to exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810–11 (same).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Nott respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying his
motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of June, 2017.
/s/
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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